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Abstract
In monitoring applications, recent data is more important than distant data. How does this affect
privacy of data analysis? We study a general class of data analyses — computing predicate sums —
with privacy. Formally, we study the problem of estimating predicate sums privately, for sliding windows
(and other well-known decay models of data, i.e. exponential and polynomial decay). We extend the
recently proposed continual privacy model of Dwork et al. [DPNR10]. We present algorithms for decayed
sum which are ε-differentially private, and are accurate. For window and exponential decay sums, our
algorithms are accurate up to additive 1/ε and polylog terms in the range of the computed function; for
polynomial decay sums which are technically more challenging because partial solutions do not compose
easily, our algorithms incur additional relative error. Further, we show lower bounds, tight within polylog
factors and tight with respect to the dependence on the probability of error.
1 Introduction
Any nontrivial physical, hardware or software system has a dashboard continually observing the system
variables, and updating various measurements. In such applications, data arrives over time, and we need
to continually output the result of some analysis f for each time instant j on all data seen thus far. This
challenges privacy of analysis because the same function is computed on several deltas of the data and
the collection of these function values can potentially leak information. Recently, the notion of differential
privacy was adopted to address this challenge [DPNR10, CSS10a], and we extend that study.
[DPNR10, CSS10a] identified the problem of computing the running sum of a series of 0/1 updates
as an important technical primitive, formulated differential privacy of computing these running sums, and
presented upper and lower bounds on accuracy of ε-differentially private algorithms for computing running
sums. They showed that an additive accuracy of O(1ε log
2 T ) with constant probability is possible for the
running sums problem, and that Ω(logT ) additive error was necessary to answer privately all running sum
queries for all time steps j ∈ [1, T ].
Power of Running Sums. The sums problem captures many analyses by applying a suitable predicate to
the data items that map them to 0/1. For example, at time j, say data item Dj = (uj ,mj) is the user ID
uj and the name of the movie mj watched in an online service by uj at that time. A natural predicate is
Pm(Dj) = 1 if mj = m and 0 otherwise; the running sum with this predicate counts the number of user IDs
that watched a particular film m. Another natural predicate is Pu(Dj) = 1 if uj = u and 0 otherwise; this
running sum counts the number of movies watched by a user u. The predicates can be different for different
items. E.g., Pj,u(Dj) = 1 if uj = u and j ∈ [9, 17] will filter movies watched by user u during business
hours 9 AM to 5 PM. Even more generally, P may be a machine learning based classification routine such
as whether a click by any user from a certain IP address on an Internet ad is a spam or not, and the running
sum will count the total number of spam clicks from the given IP address. 
Our point of departure from prior work is that in reality, monitoring applications emphasize recent data
more than data long past. For example, monitoring applications typically consider a “window”’ of continual
observations such as, last T time units, or last W updates. More generally, they discount items based on
how far they are in the past, and analyze decayed data. The commonly useful decay models are exponential
and polynomial decays [DGIM02, CS03].
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Our results. Motivated by this, we consider differential privacy of continual observations over windows
and decayed data. At each time step i the algorithm receives a bit xi; at each time step j, the algorithm is
required to report an approximation Fˆ (x1, . . . , xj) to a function F (x1, . . . , xj) and be ε-differentially private
over the entire data seen thus far. We use the notion of (δ, γ)-utility, satisfied by algorithms that at any
time step j output a value Fˆ (x1, . . . , xj) which is within δ absolute error from F (x1, . . . , xj) with probability
1− γ. Below we summarize our results for sufficiently small γ (results for larger γ can be found in the body
of the paper):
• (Window Sum) The window sum problem with window sizeW requires estimating Fw(j,W ) =
∑j
i=j−W+1 xi
for each j. Further, the whole sequence Fw of outputs, for all j, should be ε-differentially private.
We present an algorithm that achieves (δ, γ)-utility for δ = O(1ε logW log
1
γ ) (in the regime logW ≥
log 1γ ). While a window sum can be reduced to computing the difference of two running sums, existing
running sum algorithms [DPNR10, CSS10a] achieve error δ = Θ(1ε logT log
1
γ ), which can be much
larger than the rangeW of Fw, and therefore, as bad as the trivial algorithm that outputs a fixed value
independently of the input.
We also present a lower bound of Ω(min{W/2, 1ε log
1
γ }). Note that the dependence on the error
probability γ is optimal. The W/2 term in the lower bound is unavoidable, as the trivial algorithm
which outputs W/2 at every time step achieves additive approximation W/2 and is perfectly private.
This lower bound generalizes a previous lower for the running sum problem [DPNR10].
• (Exponential Decay) The exponential decay sum problem is to estimate Fe(j, α) =
∑j
i=1 xiα
j−i accu-
rately, while the whole sequence Fe of outputs, for all j, should be ε-differentially private.
We present an algorithm that achieves (δ, γ)-utility with δ = O(1ε log
α
1−α log
1
γ ). We also present a
lower bound of Ω
(
min
{
α
1−α ,
log(1/γ)
ε
})
. Once again, the dependence on the error probability γ is
optimal. Unlike Fw, Fe at each time step depends on the entire sequence of updates; nevertheless, our
algorithm achieves bounded error, polylogarithmic in the range of Fe.
• (Polynomial Decay) The polynomial decay sum problem is to estimate Fp(j, c) =
∑j
i=1
xi
(j−i+1)c accu-
rately, while the whole sequence Fp of outputs, for all j, should be ε-differentially private.
We present an algorithm that for each j returns (1± β)Fp(j, c)±
(
1
cβ2 log
1
1−β
)
log 1γ with probability
1− γ. We also present a lower bound of Ω
(
1− ε
c−1
logc−1(1/γ)
)
against purely additive error. Polynomial
decay presents a greater challenge than window sums or exponential decay since there is no direct way
to combine a polynomial decay sum over an interval [a, b] and [b, c] into a polynomial decay sum over
[a, c]. We develop a general technique that works on a large class of decay sum functions (including
polynomial decay) and reduces the problem of estimating the decay sum to keeping multiple window
sums in parallel. The technique results in a bi-criteria approximation, because of which our lower and
upper bounds are incomparable for this problem.
In comparison with the simple randomized response strategy [War65] (i.e. with probability 1/2 − ε/2
change update xi to 1− xi and keep exact statistics of the changed input), our algorithms achieve exponen-
tially smaller additive error: randomized response leads to estimators with standard deviation proportional
to the energy of the decay function, while our estimators have standard deviation polylogarithmic in the
energy. Technically,
• Our algorithms keep dyadic tree data structures as is natural and also used in [DPNR10, CSS10a] and
elsewhere. However, in order to provide estimates with error polylogarithmic in the range of the decay
function, we need to treat the dyadic tree data structure in non-uniform manner: either adding different
noise at different nodes, or weighing the contribution of an update to different nodes differently, which
is our technical contribution.
• We derive all our lower bounds from a common framework, that is inspired by work on differentially
private combinatorial optimization. This extends prior work in two ways: they apply to decay sum
problems that have not been considered before, and they apply against the weaker (δ, γ)-utility guar-
antee (rather than requiring that all queries are accurate, as in [DPNR10].
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Detailed discussion of prior work. The problem of tracking statistics on dynamic data while preserving
privacy under continual observation is introduced in [DPNR10] (a preliminary version was presented in
an invited talk by Dwork [Dwo10]). In [DPNR10], an algorithm private under continual observation is
presented for the running sum problem. For any fixed time step, their algorithm achieves additive error
of O(1ε log
1.5 T ) with constant probability, where T is an upper bound on the maximum size of the input,
known to the algorithm. Independently, [CSS10a] presented a continually private algorithm for the running
sum problem that at any step j, guarantees an additive error of O(1ε log
1.5 j) with constant probability. This
matches [DPNR10], while not knowing T .
The algorithm of [CSS10a] is related to our work: our algorithm for window sum reduces to their
algorithm for running sum when the size of the window coincides with the size of the input. However, if their
algorithm or the algorithm in [DPNR10, CSS10b] is used directly to compute window sums, then the error
at time j will be on the order of log1.5 j and for large j will overcome the window size. Further, algorithms
in [CSS10a, DPNR10, CSS10b] do not work for decayed sums.
[DPNR10] shows how to transform a private streaming algorithm that satisfies a monotonicity property
to a private, continual algorithm. However, estimating decayed sums does not have the monotonicity
property.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
Online Data Model We consider online problems with binary input: at each time step i the algorithm
receives input xi ∈ [a, b]; and is required to report an approximation Fˆ (x1, . . . , xi) to a function F (x1, . . . , xi).
We present oue upper bounds for a = 0, b = 1. For general a, b, our absolute error bounds scale linearly in
b− a.
Decayed Sum Problems The functions F we are interested in approximating are decayed sum functions.
Consider a non-increasing function g : N → R+ such that g(0) = 1. The decayed sum induced by g is the
function F (j) = F (x1, . . . , xj) =
∑j
i=1 xig(j − i). I.e., F is the convolution of the input and a non-increasing
function g. The decayed sum problems we consider are defined below
• when g(i) = 1∀i, the running sum problem (considered in [CSS10a, Dwo10, DPNR10]): Fs(j) =∑j
i=1 xi.
• when g(i) = 1{i<W}, the window sum problem (with window size W ): Fw(j,W ) =
∑j
i=j−W+1 xi. To
simplify notation, in the above definition we assume that xi = 0 for all i ≤ 0.
• when g(i) = αi (α < 1), the exponential decay sum problem: Fe(j, α) =
∑j
i=1 xiα
j−i.
• when g(i) = (i+ 1)−c (c > 1), the polynomial decay sum problem: Fp(j, c) =
∑j
i=1
xi
(j−i+1)c .
The last three problems have not been considered in the differential privacy literature before, and specifically
not in the continual observation model. The problems of keeping event counts and other statistics over
windows [DGIM02] and keeping decayed (in particular exponential and polynomial decay) sums [CS03] have
been studied in the field of small space streaming algorithms.
Differential Privacy We use the standard definition of differential privacy, applied to the online data
model:
Definition 1 ([DMNS06, DPNR10]). Let A be a randomized online algorithm that at time step j outputs
Fˆ (x1, . . . , xj) ∈ R. A satisfies ε-differential privacy if for all T ∈ Z, for all measurable subsets S ⊆ R
T , all
possible inputs x1, . . . , xT , all j and all x
′
j (where probability is over the coin throws of A)
Pr[(Fˆ (x1, . . . , xj , . . . , xk))
T
k=1 ∈ S] ≤ e
ε Pr[(Fˆ (x1, . . . , x
′
j , . . . , xk))
T
k=1 ∈ S].
This is the basic definition of differential privacy as in [DMNS06], but with the modification that the
algorithm receives the input online and produces output at every step, and the whole sequence of outputs is
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T = T (L,U)
T
′ = T (L + 4, U)[L,U]
[L,L+3] [L+4, U]
[L,L+1] [L+2,L+3] [L+4,L+5] [L+6, U]
L L + 1 L + 2 L + 3 L + 4 u=L+5 L + 6 U
c
Lu′
= cL,L+3
s(u, T ′) = cL+4,L+5
s(u,T ) = cL,L+3 + cL+4,L+5
Figure 1: Dyadic tree data structure. In this example, u = L+5 is shown in a blue node, u′ = L+3, and the
prefix sum s(u, T ) = cL,L+3+ cL+4,L+5 is obtained by adding the counters at the two green nodes [L,L+3]
and [L+ 4, L+ 5].
available to an adversary. This model of privacy for online algorithms operating on time series data, termed
privacy under continual observation, was introduced by [Dwo10, DPNR10].
We use the following basic facts about differential privacy. The first theorem gives a simple way to
achieve differential privacy for algorithms with numerical output, based on adding random noise scaled
according to the sensitivity of the statistic being computed. The second fact is that composing multiple
privacy mechanisms results in smooth privacy loss.
Theorem 1 ([DMNS06]). For a function F : [a, b]T → Rd, let the sensitivity of F , SF be the smallest real
number that satisfies ∀x1, . . . , xT , ∀j ∈ [T ], ∀x′j ∈ [a, b] :
‖F (x1, . . . , xj , . . . , xT )− F (x1, . . . , x
′
j , . . . , xT )‖1 ≤ SF
Then an algorithm that on input x1, . . . , xT outputs Fˆ (x1, . . . , xT ) = F (x1, . . . , xT ) + Lap(SF /ε)
d satisfies
ε-differential privacy, where Lap(λ)d is a sample of d independent Laplace random variables with mean 0
and scale parameter λ.
Theorem 2 ([DMNS06]). Let algorithm A1 satisfy ε1-differential privacy and algorithm A2 satisfy ε2-
differential privacy. Then an algorithm A that on input x = {x1, . . . , xT } outputs A(A1(x),A2(x)) satisfies
(ε1 + ε2)-differential privacy.
Utility We adopt the following, commonly used notion of utility:
Definition 2. Let A be a randomized online algorithm that at time step j outputs Fˆ (x1, . . . , xj) ∈ R. Then,
A achieves (δ, γ)-utility with respect to a function F , if for all j, Pr[|Fˆ (x1, . . . , xj)−F (x1, . . . , xj)| > δ] < γ.
Dyadic Tree Datastructure We repeatedly use the following dyadic tree data structure which is common
in algorithmics. This data structure is a balanced augmented search tree and variants of it are common in
much algorithmic work.
Let T (L,U) be a complete binary tree of height h = log(U − L + 1) + 1 (assuming, for simplicity, that
U − L + 1 is a power of 2). The leaves of the tree are indexed by the integers L,L + 1, . . . , U , and if two
sibling nodes are indexed by the intervals [l1, u1] and [l1 = u1 + 1, u2], then their parent is indexed by
[l1, u2]. Note that at level k of the tree (the leaves being at level 1), the indexing intervals have the form
[L+(i− 1)2k−1, L+ i2k−1− 1] for i ∈ [1, 2h−k]. We call a node whose indexing interval precedes its sibling’s
indexing interval a left node; the sibling of a left node is a right node. With each node we associate a variable:
for the node indexed by [l, u], the associated variable is denoted clu. Given a tree T = T (L,U) and a prefix
interval [L, u], we define function s(u, T ) recursively:
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• if [L, u] indexes a node in T , then s(u, T ) = cLu;
• otherwise, let u′ be the largest integer less than u such that [L, u′] indexes some node in T ; equivalently,
u′ is the largest integer less than u that can be written as u′ = L+ 2k−1 − 1. Let T ′ be the subtree of
T rooted at the sibling of [L, u′] (indexed by [u′ + 1, u′ + 2k−1]); then s(u, T ) = cLu′ + s(u, T ′).
The following lemma is essential to our analysis and can be easily proved by induction.
Lemma 1. There exist r ≤ ⌈log(u−L+1)⌉ integers u1, . . . ur = u such that s(u, T ) = cLu1+
∑r−1
k=1 cuk+1,uk+1 .
Furthermore, all nodes indexed by [uk + 1, uk+1] are left nodes in T , and each node is in a different level of
T .
Proof. The integers u1, . . . , ur are given directly by the recursive definition of s(u, T ). To bound r, consider
that at each step in the recursion, unless [L, u] indexes a node in T , the tree T ′ has at most half the number
of leaves of the smallest subtree of T that contains u as a leaf. Initially the smallest subtree that contains u
as a leaf has number of leaves equal to the smallest power of 2 greater than or equal to u − L + 1, i.e. the
number of leaves initially is 2⌈log(u−L+1)⌉. The recursion stops when we reach a tree with only a single node,
and, therefore, we make at most ⌈log(u − L+ 1)⌉ recursive calls. The bound on r follows.
The condition that all nodes are left siblings follows from the fact each node is indexed by an interval
that contains the leftmost leaf of the current subtree.
Finally, notice that the only way to pick two nodes on the same level is if after picking u′, in the next
step of the recursion we pick the root of T ′. However, in this case we would have picked the parent of [L, u′]
instead of [L, u′], a contradiction.
Chernoff Bound for Laplace VariablesWe will use the following Chernoff bound for sums of independent
Laplace random variables.
Lemma 2. Let s1, . . . , sn be independent Laplace random variables such that si ∼ Lap(bi). Denote S =∑n
i=1 si and σ =
√
2
∑n
i=1 b
2
i . Then, for all λ < mini
0.75
bi
, we have Pr[|S| ≥ tσ] ≤ 2 exp(0.75λ2σ2 − λtσ).
Proof. We use the standard technique of bounding the moment generating function of S and applying
Markov’s inequality. Details follow.
Since the distribution of S is symmetric, we have Pr[|S| ≥ tσ] = 2Pr[S ≥ tσ]. For any λ, we have:
Pr[S ≥ tσ] = Pr[eλS ≥ eλtσ]
≤
E[eλS ]
eλtσ
=
∏n
i=1 E[e
λsi ]
eλtσ
(1)
For λ < 1/bi, the moment generating function of the Laplace random variable si is E[e
λsi ] = 1/(1 − λ2b2i ).
Assuming λbi ≤ .75, we have
E[eλsi ] =
1
1− λ2b2i
< exp(−
3
2
λ2b2i ).
Substituting into (1), we get
Pr[S ≥ tσ] ≤ exp(−
3
2
λ2
n∑
i=1
b2i − λtσ),
as desired.
3 Upper Bounds
3.1 Window Sum
A key observation for computing window sums with error polylogarithmically bounded in W is that, unlike
with running sum, only the lowest logW +1 layers of the dyadic tree are necessary to compute window sum.
However, if we keep a dyadic tree for every window of size W , each update will contribute to more than W
variables, resulting in data structures with large sensitivity, which, for differential privacy, translates into
5
PSfrag replacements
W = 4
T1 = T (1, W ) = T (1, 4) T2 = T (W + 1, 2W ) = T (5, 8)
[1, 4] [5, 8]
[1, 2] [3, 4] [5, 6] [7, 8]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
c1 =x1+z1 c2 =x2+z2 c3 =x3+z3 c4 =x4+z4 c5 =x5+z5 c6 =x6+z6 c7 =x7+z7 c8 =z8
c12 = x1 + x2 + z12 c34 = x3 + x4 + z34 c56 = x5 + x6 + z56 c78 = x7 + z78
c14 = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + z14 c58 = x5 + x6 + x7 + z58
Fˆw(7, W = 4) = c14 − (c12 + c3) + (c56 + c7)
Figure 2: Window sum for a window size W = 4. This example illustrates the algorithm at time i = 7, and
the output is Fˆw(7,W = 4) = s(W, T1)− s(3, T1) + s(7, T2) = c14 − (c12 + c3) + (c56 + c7) = x4 + x5 + x6 +
x7 + z14 − z12 − z3 + z56 + z7, where zlu denotes the noise at node [l, u].
Algorithm 1 WindowsSum
For k ≥ 1, define Tk = T ((k − 1)W + 1, kW ), with all clu initialized to Lap((logW + 1)/ε).
for all inputs xi do
add xi to all clu in T⌈i/W⌉ such that i ∈ [l, u].
output: Fˆw(i,W ) = s((k − 1)W,Tk−1)− s(i−W,Tk−1) + s(i, Tk), where k = ⌈i/W ⌉.
end for
more noise. Our main idea is that instead of keeping a dyadic tree for every window, we can divide the input
into blocks of size W , and view the windows that span two blocks as the union of a suffix and a prefix of
two blocks.
The algorithm WindowSum is shown as Algorithm 1. In the remainder of this section we assume that
W is an exact power of 2.
Theorem 3. WindowSum satisfies ε-differential privacy, and achieves (δ, γ)-utility with
δ =
{
O(1ε log
1.5W log0.5 1γ ), logW ≥ log
1
γ
O(1ε logW log
1
γ ), logW < log
1
γ
Furthermore, WindowSum can be implemented to use O(W ) words of space and to run in O(logW ) time
per update.
Proof. Privacy. Observe that any variable clu used to compute Fˆw(j,W ) satisfies l ≤ u ≤ j. Therefore,
the counters clu that contribute to Fˆw(j,W ) will not be updated after time step j and Fˆw(j,W ) will be
identically distributed if it is computed at any time step T ≥ j, so for the analysis we can assume that
all outputs are produced at time step T . Next we fix T and argue that WindowSum is ε-differentially
private for inputs of size T . Since the choice of T is arbitrary, privacy for all T follows. For this purpose,
let c(x) be the vector of the values of all variables (in an arbitrary order) clu such that u ≤ T when the
input is x = (x1, . . . , xT ). Let also c0(x) be c(x) with the initializing Laplace noise removed. Since each xj
contributes to exactly logW + 1 variables clu
∀j ∈ [T ], ∀x′j ∈ [0, 1] : ‖c0(x1, . . . , xj , . . . , xT )− c0(x1, . . . , x
′
j , . . . , xT )‖1 ≤ logW + 1.
Differential privacy of c(x) follows from above and Theorem 1. Since the sequence of outputs of WindowSum
up to time step T is a deterministic function of c(x), privacy of WindowSum follows.
Accuracy. It is easy to see that EFˆw(j,W ) = Fw(j,W ). By Lemma 1, for each k and each u, s(u, Tk) is
the sum of at most logW random variables, each with variance 2(logW + 1)2/ε2. Therefore, the standard
deviation σ of Fˆw(j,W ) is O(log
1.5W/ǫ).
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Algorithm 2 AllWindowSum
Initialize T = T (1, 1), with c1,1 initialized to Lap(1/ε1).
for all updates xi do
if the rightmost leaf of T is i− 1 then
Grow T so that T = T (1, 2(i− 1)), adding additional nodes and variables as necessary; initialize new
variables at level k to Lap(1/εk).
Add the value c01,i−1 to the root variable c1,2(i−1), where c
0
lu is the value of clu without the Laplace
noise.
end if
Add xi to all clu in such that i ∈ [l, u].
Let W ′ = 2⌈logW⌉. At time step j, output Fˆ ′w(j,W ) = s((k − 1)W, Tk−1) − s(j −W, Tk−1) + s(j, Tk),
where k = ⌈j/W ′⌉.
end for
We consider two cases. For the first case, let t = 2
√
ln(1/γ) and λ = φ tσ for a constant φ to be
determined later. By Lemma 2, as long as λ < 0.75ε/(logW +1), we have that Pr[|Fˆw(j,W )−Fw(j,W )| >
C
√
log(1/γ)σ] < γ for some fixed constant C that depends on φ. A calculation shows that as long as
logW ≥ log(1/γ), the minimum value of φ such that the constraint on λ holds can be bounded below by a
constant. This completes the analysis of the first case.
For the second case, when logW < log(1/γ), we set the following parameters: η = logln(1/γ) lnW
(notice that η < 1); t = C′ ln(1/γ)√
lnW
, and λ = t
η/(2−η)
σ =
C′η/(2−η)
√
lnW
σ , where C
′ is a constant chosen so
that λ < 0.75ε/(logW + 1) holds. Applying Lemma 2, we have that for a value C that depends on C′,
Pr[S ≥ C 1ε log(1/γ) logW ] ≤ exp(Ω(t
2/(2−η))) = exp(−Ω(ln 1/γ)).
For the running time and space complexity analysis, notice that each update requires accessing O(logW )
nodes, and that only the last two dyadic trees need to be stored.
We can also show that we can approximate window sums simultaneously for all window sizes and preserve
privacy under continual observation. Our approximation is different for different window sizes W , and for
any particular W , it is almost the same as that of Theorem 3. Details can be found in Appendix 4.
4 Window Sum Simultaneously for all W
Here we give an algorithm that works simultaneously for all window sizes. Our main observation is that
if for window size W we divide the input into blocks of size W ′ ∈ [W, 2W ] instead of exactly W as in
WindowSum, then we can store all necessary dyadic tree datastructures as subtrees of a single dyadic tree.
However, storing the whole dyadic tree with the same noise at any level will result in error of size Ω(log1.5 T )
for all W . Instead, we want to make sure that within a subtree of height h, the noise added to any variable
is proportional to h. To achieve this, we use a different privacy parameter εk at level k of the dyadic tree
and ensure that the sum of privacy parameters converges to ε.
Let β > 1 be a parameter and ζ(·) be the Riemann zeta function: ζ(β) =
∑∞
1 i
−β . Set ǫk = εζ(β)kβ . The
algorithm AllWindowSum is shown as Algorithm 2. Proof of theorem below is analogous to Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. There exists a constant K s.t. AllWindowSum satisfies ε-differential privacy and achieves
(δ, γ)-utility, where
δ =
{
O(1ε log
1.5β W log0.5 1γ ), logW ≥ K log
1
γ
O(1ε log
β W log 1γ ), logW < K log
1
γ
Furthermore, the algorithm can be implemented to use O(T ) words of space and run in O(log T ) time per
update on inputs consisting of T updates.
Proof. Privacy. The proof of privacy is analogous to the proof of privacy for Theorem 3, but we treat
different levels of T separately and use Theorem 2 to bound the total privacy loss. More precisely, we show
that level k in the tree satisfies εk-differential privacy and use the fact that
∑∞
k=1 εk = ε.
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Algorithm 3 ExponentialSum
Set λ = 1α ln 2
(
ln 2α1−1α +
1
2 + ln 2
)
.
Initialize T = T (1, 1), with c1,1 initialized to Lap(λ/ε)
for all updates xi do
if the rightmost leaf of T is i− 1 then
Grow T so that T = T (1, 2(i−1)), adding additional nodes and variables as necessary and initializing
new variables to Lap(λ/ε).
Add the value αi−1c01,i−1 to the root variable c1,2(i−1), where c
0
lu is the value of clu without the Laplace
noise.
end if
for all [l, u] such i ∈ [l, u] and the node indexed by [l, u] is a left node do
add xiα
u−i to clu
end for
output Fˆe(j, α) =
∑r
k=0 cuk,uk+1α
j−uk+1 .
end for
Utility. The utility analysis is also analogous to the proof of Theorem 3, noticing the following facts: (1)
W ≤ W ′ ≤ 2W ; (2) as an upper bound on the variance of any variable used to compute Fˆ ′w(j,W ) we can
use the variance of variables at level logW ′+1, which is O(logβ W ). The rest of the proof is unchanged.
4.1 Exponential Decay
While for the window sum problem we keep a sequence of dyadic trees, for the exponential decay problem we
keep a single dyadic tree that grows over time. The main property of exponentially decaying sums that we
use is that if S1 is the exponential decay sum over a time interval [a, b− 1] and S2 is the exponential decay
sum over a time interval [b, c], then αc−b+1S1 + S2 is the exponential decay sum over the time interval [a, c].
Thus at a node in the dyadic tree that is indexed by interval [l, u] we can keep the exponential decay sum for
that interval. However, doing this for every interval results in a data structure with unbounded sensitivity.
We update only the left nodes in the tree and show that we can bound the sensitivity in that case.
The ExponentialSum algorithm is shown as Algorithm 3. We analyze the algorithm for α ∈ (2/3, 1);
observe that when α ≤ 2/3, the range of the Fe is [0, 3], and, thereofore, achieving (1.5, 0)-utility is trivial.
Thus α→ 1 is the interesting regime for approximating Fe.
The following lemma is useful in the analysis.
Lemma 3. For an arbitrary i, let [l1, u1], [l2, u2], . . . be the sequence of intervals such that ∀k : i ∈ [lk, uk] and
[lk, uk] is a left node. Assume the intervals are ordered in ascending order of uk− lk. Then uk− i ≥ 2
k−1−1.
Proof. By induction. The base case is trivial, as from i ∈ [l1, u1] follows u1 − i ≥ 0. For the inductive
step, it suffices to show that uk − uk−1 ≥ 2k−2. By the construction of T , all nodes indexed by intervals
[l, u] such that i ∈ [l, u] lie on the path from the leaf indexed by i to the root of T . Therefore, all nodes
indexed by [lk, uk] for some k are ancestors of i, and, by the construction of T we have uk − lk + 1 ≥ 2k−1;
in particular, [lk, uk] is an ancestor of [lk−1, uk−1] and uk−1 − lk−1 + 1 ≥ 2k−2. By assumption, all nodes
indexed by [lk, uk] are left nodes; let the right sibling of [lk−1, uk−1] be the node indexed by [l′k−1, u
′
k−1].
By construction, u′k−1 − l
′
k−1 = uk−1 − lk−1 and the parent of both nodes is indexed by [lk−1, u
′
k−1]. All
ancestors of [lk−1, uk−1] are indexed by intervals that contain [lk−1, u′k−1] as a subinterval, and, therefore,
uk ≥ u
′
k−1 = uk−1 + (uk−1 − lk−1 + 1)
≥ uk−1 + 2k−2
This completes the inductive step.
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Theorem 5. Assume α ∈ (2/3, 1) and let K be a universal constant. ExponentialSum satisfies ε-
differential privacy and achieves (δ, γ)-utility with
δ =
{
O(1ε
α
1−α log
0.5 1
γ ), log
α
1−α ≥ log
1
γ
O(1ε log
α
1−α log
1
γ ), log
α
1−α < log
1
γ
Furthermore, ExponentialSum can be implemented to use O(log T ) words of space and to run in O(log T )
time per update on inputs consisting of T updates.
Proof. Privacy. It is sufficient to fix T and argue that ExponentialSum is ε-differentially private for
inputs of size T when all outputs for j ≤ T are produced at step T .
We analyze the sensitivity of T . Define c0(x) as in the proof of Theorem 3 and [l1, u1], [l2, u2], . . . as in
Lemma 3. We have
‖c0(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xT )− c0(x1, . . . , 1− xi, . . . , xT )‖1 ≤
∞∑
k=1
αuk−ixi ≤
∞∑
k=1
αuk−i
≤
∞∑
k=1
α2
k−1−1 =
1
α
∞∑
k=0
α2
k
≤
1
α
+
1
α
∫ ∞
0
α2
x
dx
=
1
α
+
1
α ln 2
∫ ∞
ln 1α
e−t
t
dt
=
ln 2 + E1(ln
1
α )
α ln 2
. (2)
Here E1(x) = E1(x) =
∫∞
x
e−t
t dt. We have the following series expansion for E1, which converges for all real
|x| ≤ π [AS64]:
E1(x) = −η − lnx+
∞∑
k=1
(−1)k+1xk
k!k
, (3)
where η is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. Since, by assumption, α > e−1, we have ln 1α < 1. For x < 1, the
last term in (3) is bounded by η + E1(1) = η +
1
2 . Therefore, we have,
E1(2 ln
1
α
) ≤ − ln ln
1
α
+
1
2
= ln
1
ln 1α
+
1
2
(4)
For x ∈ (0, 2), we have the following series expansion for ln x:
lnx = x− 1−
∞∑
k=2
(1 − x)k
k
. (5)
Since by assumption 1/α− 1 < 1/2, we have ln(1/α) ≥ (1/α− 1)/2. Substituting in (4), we get
E1(ln
1
α
) ≤ ln
1
1−α
2α
+
1
2
= ln
2α
1− α
+
1
2
(6)
Substituting (6) into (2) gives us the following bound on sensitivity:
‖c0(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xT )− c0(x1, . . . , 1− xi, . . . , xT )‖1
≤
1
α ln 2
(
ln
2α
1− 1α
+
1
2
+ ln 2
)
(7)
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Algorithm 4 PolynomialSum
Set λ = log(1/(1−β))cβ2 +
1
β .
Start an instance of WindowSum for input x1, . . . with window size W1 = b(1) and initializing noise for
each variable Lap(λ/ε). Set j∗ = 1.
for all updates xi do
if i = b(j∗) + 1 then
Set j∗ = j∗ + 1.
Start a new instance of WindowSum with window size Wj∗ = b(j
∗)− b(j∗ − 1) and and initializing
noise for each variable Lap(λ/ε).
end if
for all k ≤ j∗ do
Update the k-th instance of WindowSum with input (1− β)k−1xi−b(k−1)
end for
Output Fˆp(i, c) =
∑
j≥0:b(j)<i Fw((1 − β)
jx1, . . . , (1− β)jxi−b(j),Wj+1).
end for
By Theorem 1 and (7), ExponentialSum satisfies ε-differential privacy.
Accuracy. Clearly, EFˆe(j, α) = Fe(j, α). Next we upper bound σ
2, the maximum variance of Fˆ (j, α) over
all j. By Lemma 3, all intervals [1, u1], [u1, u2], . . . , [ur, j] correspond to nodes in distinct levels of T , and
therefore have sizes which are distinct powers of 2. We have, for some fixed constant C,
σ2 ≤
(
C
log α1−α
αε
)2 ∞∑
i=1
α2(2
i−1)
=
(
C
log α1−α
αε
)2
1
α2
∞∑
i=2
α2
i
≤
1
α2
(
C
log α1−α
αε
)3
.
The proof can be completed analogously to the proof of Theorem 3.
4.2 Polynomial Decay
Unlike the running sum, window sum, or exponential decay sum problems, there is no easy way to combine a
polynomial decay sums over intervals [a, b−1] and [b, c] into a polynomial decay sum over [a, c]. Therefore, our
techniques for estimating polynomial decay sum are considerably different. On a high level, we approximate
the polynomial decay function g(i) = (i + 1)−c by a function g′ that is constant on exponentially growing
in size intervals. Then we can approximate the decay sum induced by g′ by running multiple instances
of our window sum algorithm in parallel. This technique results in a bi-criteria approximation, i.e. our
approximation guarantee has both a multiplicative and an additive approximation factor. As c→ 1 (i.e. as
the range of the polynomial decay sum grows), the additive approximation factor remains bounded and
is dominated by β−2, where (1 ± β) is the multiplicative approximation factor. Thus the approximation
guarantees for our algorithm are mostly determined by a trade-off between additive and multiplicative
approximation.
For a given polynomial decay function g = (i + 1)−c and the induced decay sum F , let us a fix a
multiplicative error parameter β and define a function b as ∀j ≥ 1 : b(j) = max{i : g(i) ≥ (1 − β)j} and
b(0) = 0. Intuitively g(i) is almost constant for i ∈ [b(j − 1), b(j)).
We can now define a function g′ that approximates g: ∀i ∈ [b(j − 1), b(j)) : g′(i) = (1− β)j−1 Let F ′ be
the decay sum induced by g′. From the definition of g′ it is immediate that ∀j, ∀x ∈ {0, 1}j : (1− β)F (j) ≤
F ′(j) ≤ F (j).
The PolynomialSum algorithm is shown as Algorithm 4. Note that we call the j-th instance of Win-
dowSum with input consisting of time updates in {0, (1 − β)j−1}. It is straightforward to check that the
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WindowSum algorithm can handle such scaled instances without modification. Note also that we modify
the WindowSum algorithm slightly by adjusting the magnitude of noise added to the variables associated
with the dyadic trees kept by WindowSum.
Theorem 6. PolynomialSum satisfies ε-differential privacy, and for any j, with probability 1−γ, we have
(1− β)Fp(j, c)−O(δ) ≤ Fˆp(c) ≤ Fp(j, c) +O(δ), where
δ =


1
ε
(
1
cβ2 log
1
1−β
)1.5
log0.5 1γ if
1
cβ2 log
1
1−β ≥ log
1
γ
1
ε
1
cβ2 log
1
1−β log
1
γ if
1
cβ2 log
1
1−β < log
1
γ
Furthermore, PolynomialSum can be implemented to use O(T ) words of space and run in O(log2 T/ log(1/(1−
β))) time per update on inputs consisting of T updates.
Proof. Privacy. The privacy analysis is analogous to the analysis in the proof of Theorem 3, but we bound
sensitivity over all instances of WindowSum. Due to the scaling of the input, the sensitivity of the j-th
instance of WindowSum is bounded by (1 + β)j−1(logWj + 1). Let us first bound Wj . Observe that
b(j) = ⌊g−1((1 − β)j⌋. For g(i) = (i + 1)−c, we have b(j) ∈ [(1− β)−j/c − 2, (1− β)−j/c − 1]. Then Wj can
be bounded as Wj = b(j)− b(j − 1) ≤ (1− β)−j/c − (1− β)−(j−1)/c +1. Since 1− β < 1 and j ≥ 1, we have
Wj ≤ (1− β)
−j/c. We can then bound the overall sensitivity is by
∞∑
j=1
(1− β)j−1 logWj +
∞∑
j=0
(1− β)j ≤
∞∑
j=1
(1 − β)j−1 log
1
(1− β)j/c
+
1
β
=
1
c
log
1
(1− β)
∞∑
j=1
j(1 − β)j−1 +
1
β
=
1
cβ2
log
1
(1− β)
+
1
β
(8)
Theorem 1 and (8) complete the privacy proof.
Accuracy. Note that EFˆp(j, c) = F
′(j). The variance of Fw((1−β)jxb(j), . . . , (1−β)jxk,Wj) is at most
2(1− β)2jλ2 logWj . Therefore, the total variance σ2 of Fˆp(j, c) is
σ2 ≤ λ2
1
c
log
1
1− β
∞∑
j=0
(j + 1)(1− β)2j
= λ2
1
cβ2(2− β)2
log
1
1− β
= O
((
1
cβ2
log
1
1− β
)3)
Using Lemma 2 as in Theorem 3 we can show that for any j, with probability at least 1− γ,
|Fˆp(j, c)− F
′(j)| =
{
O(( 1cβ2 log
1
1−β )
1.5 log0.5 1γ ) if
1
cβ2 log
1
1−β ≥ log
1
γ
O( 1cβ2 log
1
1−β log
1
γ ) if
1
cβ2 log
1
1−β < log
1
γ
Since for all x and all j, (1− β)F (j) ≤ F ′(j) ≤ F (j), this completes the proof.
This algorithm can more generally be used to compute a private (under continual observation) approx-
imation to a decayed sum F induced by a decay function g as long as g−1 grows subexponentially. In this
case sensitivity remains bounded and the additive error guarantee is dominated by a function of β, but the
exact function depends on g. The algorithm is not applicable to the window or running sum problem, since
for them g−1 is not well defined; the guarantee for exponential decay sum is incomparable with the one in
Theorem 5.
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5 Lower Bounds
We give a general framework for lower bounding the dependence of the error δ on the error probability γ
for algorithms that are private under continual observation and achieve (δ, γ)-utility. We also instantiate
the framework with a construction that yields concrete lower bounds for the three decay sum problems
considered in this paper. As far as the dependence on error probability is concerned, our lower bounds for
window and exponential decay sums are tight. Our lower bound for polynomial decay sums is against a
purely additive approximation and is not directly comparable to the upper bounds on the approximation
factors of our algorithm.
Suppose that for a fixed error probability γ, we want to prove a lower bound on δ for any ε-differentially
private algorithm that achieves (δ, γ)-utility with respect to a function F (x1, . . . , xj) We can take γ = 2/3q,
and it follows, by the union bound, that for any set Q ⊆ [n] of size q, with probability 2/3, the algorithm is
within an absolute error δ from F (x1, . . . , xj) for all j ∈ Q. Assume that for some T we can construct N +1
instances x0, . . . ,xN , each of length T , that satisfy the following properties:
1. (Q, δ)-independence: for all a, b ∈ {0, . . . , N}, a 6= b, there exists some j ∈ Q ⊆ T such that
|F (xa1 , . . . , x
a
j )− F (x
b
1, . . . , x
b
j)| > 2δ.
2. D-closeness : for all a, b ∈ {0, . . . , N}, we have dH(xa,xb) ≤ D, where dH is the standard Hamming
distance.
Lemma 4. Assume there exists an ε-differentially private algorithm A that at time step j outputs Fˆ (x1, . . . , xj).
Assume further that for any Q ⊆ N, |Q| = q, we have Pr[∀j ∈ Q : |Fˆ (x1, . . . , xj)−F (x1, . . . , xj)| ≤ δ] ≥ 2/3.
If for some Q there exists a set {x0, . . . ,xN} that satisfies (Q, δ)-independence and D-closeness with respect
to F , then D > lnN+ln 2ǫ
Proof. Let B(xi) = {f : |fj − F (xi1, . . . , x
i
j)| ≤ δ}. By assumption, Pr[(Fˆ (x
i
1, . . . , x
i
j))
T
j=1 ∈ B(x
i)] ≥ 2/3.
Then, by the definition of differential privacy and D-closeness, we have
∀i : Pr[(Fˆ (x01, . . . , x
0
j ))
T
j=1 ∈ B(x
i)] ≥ e−εD2/3.
By (Q, δ)-independence, B(xa) ∩B(xb) = ∅ for all a 6= b. Therefore,
Pr[(Fˆ (x01, . . . , x
0
j))
T
j=1 ∈
N⋃
i=1
B(xi)] =
N∑
i=1
Pr[(Fˆ (x01, . . . , x
0
j))
T
j=1 ∈ B(x
i)] ≥ Ne−εD2/3.
However, since B(x0) ∩
⋃N
i=1B(x
i) = ∅, by the assumptions on A we have
Pr[(Fˆ (x01, . . . , x
0
j ))
T
j=1 ∈
N⋃
i=1
B(xi)] < 1/3.
Therefore, 2N < eεD, and the lemma follows by taking logarithms.
In order to apply Lemma 4, we need a method to construct a set of instances satisfying (Q, δ)-independence
and D-closeness for a given error bound δ, such that D is upper bounded by a function of δ and N is lower-
bounded by a function of |Q|. We show a construction that allows us to derive a lower bound for any decayed
sum problem, where, naturally, the form of the lower bound depends on the specific problem, i.e. on the decay
function g. As corollaries, we derive specific lower bounds for the problems we consider in this paper. In
our construction, the set of vectors {xi}qi=0 is defined as x
0 = (0Dq) and xi = (0(i−1)D, 1D, 0(q−i)D). We set
Q = {j : D divides j} and choose δ according to the specific decay function g. Consider a general decayed
sum function F (x1, . . . , xj) with a decay function g. The construction gives our main lower bound theorem.
Theorem 7. Assume there exists an ε-differentially private algorithm A that at time step j outputs Fˆ (x1, . . . , xj)
and achieves (δ, γ)-utility with respect to a decayed sum function F induced by g. Denote G(x) =
∑x−1
i=0 g(i).
Then δ ≥ 12G(Ω(
log(1/γ)
ε )).
For the three problems considered in this paper we derive the following corollaries.
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Corollary 1. Assume there exists an ε-differentially private algorithm A that at time step j outputs Fˆw(j,W )
and achieves (δ, γ)-utility with respect to Fw(j,W ). Then, δ ≥ Ω
(
min
{
W
2 ,
log(1/γ)
ε
})
.
Note that the lower bound of [DPNR10] is a special case of the above corollary for γ = 2/3W = 2/3T .
Corollary 2. Assume there exists an ε-differentially private algorithm A that at time step j outputs Fˆe(j, α)
and achieves (δ, γ)-utility with respect to Fe(j, α). Then, for α ∈ (2/3, 1) we have δ ≥ Ω
(
min
{
α
1−α ,
log(1/γ)
ε
})
.
Corollary 3. Assume there exists an ε-differentially private algorithm A that at time step j outputs Fˆp(j, c)
and achieves (δ, γ)-utility with respect to Fp(j, c). Then, δ ≥ Hc(Ω(
log(1/γ)
ε )) ≥ Ω
(
1− ε
c−1
logc−1(1/γ)
)
, where
Hc(k) is the k-th generalized harmonic number in power c.
6 Extensions and Applications
Algorithms for sum problems can be used to compute more sophisticated statistics as we described earlier.
In this section we exhibit a few extensions and applications of our algorithms. We show how they can be
used to compute sums over individual predicates and some special cases of sums over holistic predicates,
including distinct counts which is of great interest. We also show how to compute histograms (over windows
or decayed). In the following discussion we denote an arbitrary universe as U .
6.1 Individual Predicates
We define an individual predicate abstractly as a function P : U → [0, 1]. Let the input at time step i be
ui, where ui ∈ U . The decayed predicate sum for an individual predicate P and decayed sum function F
then is F (P(u1), . . . ,P(uj)). Differential privacy and utility for predicate sums can be defined analogously
to decayed sums. The following claim is immediate for individual predicates:
Theorem 8. Let A be an ε-differentially private algorithm that achieves (δ, γ)-utility with respect to a
decayed sum F . Then, on input P(u1), . . . ,P(uT ), A is ε-differentially private with respect to u1, . . . , uT
and and achieves (δ, γ)-utility with respect to the decayed predicate sum for P and F .
6.2 Holistic Predicate Sum
Individual predicates are limited in that they can depend only on a single update ui rather than the whole
sequence of updates. Here we define the more general notion of holistic predicates and treat the special case
of low-sensitivity holistic predicates, with the distinct count problem as an important application.
A holistic predicate is a function P : U∗ → [0, 1]. The decayed predicate sum for the holistic predicate P
is F (P(u1), . . . ,P(u1, . . . , uj)).
Let us call a holistic predicate k-sensitive if for any sequence of updates u1, . . . , uT , any j ∈ [T ] and any
u′j ∈ U , the sequences P(u1, . . . , uj), . . ., P(u1, . . . , uj , . . . , uT ) and P(u1, . . . , u
′
j), . . . ,P(u1, . . . , u
′
j, . . . , uT )
differ in at most k components. The following theorem follows from the basic properties of ε-differential
privacy (proof omitted).
Theorem 9. Let A be an ε-differentially private algorithm that achieves (δ, γ)-utility with respect to a
decayed sum F . Then, when given input P(u1), . . ., P(u1, . . . , uT ) for a k-sensitive holistic predicate P, A is
kε-differentially private with respect to u1, . . . , uT and and achieves (δ, γ)-utility with respect to the decayed
predicate sum for P and F .
We can show that the fundamental distinct count problem can be encoded as a 2-sensitive holistic
predicate. In the distinct element count problem the input is a sequence of updates u1, u2, . . ., and at each
time step j the goal is to approximate the number of distinct elements seen so far, i.e. |{u ∈ U : ∃i ≤
j s.t. ui = u}|. This problem is equivalent to a predicate sum problem where F is simply the running sum
function, and P(u1, . . . , uj) is 0 when ∃i < j : ui = uj and 1 otherwise. The proof of the following lemma is
deferred to the full version of the paper.
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Lemma 5. The predicate P(u1, . . . , uj) = 1(6 ∃i < j : ui = uj) is 2-sensitive.
Then, by Theorem 9 and the algorithm of Dwork et al. [DPNR10] for the running sum problem, we have
the following result:
Theorem 10. There exists an ε-differentially private algorithm that achieves (δ, γ)-utility for the discrete
element count problem with δ = O(log1.5 T log0.5 1γ ) (in the case logT = ω(log
1
γ )) or δ = O(log T log
1
γ ) (in
the case logT = O(log 1γ )), where T is the number of updates.
We leave open the problem of designing a private algorithm for estimating, at each time step, the number
of distinct elements seen over the last W updates, with absolute error polylogarithmic in W .
6.3 Histograms
Consider a situation in which each update can belong to one of several categories. More formally, let the
update at time step i be (ui, xi) ∈ U×[0, 1]. Let x(u, j) be x restricted to all components xi for i ≤ j such that
ui = u. Then, at time step j, the algorithm outputs a vector y(j) ∈ RU , where yu(j) is an approximation to
F (x(u, j)), for some decayed sum function F . We call this the decayed histogram problem for F . Differential
privacy under continual observation for decayed histogram problems can be defined analogously to decayed
sum problems.
Given an algorithm to approximate a decayed sum, it can be easily extended to an algorithm for the
corresponding decayed histogram problem.
Theorem 11. Let A be an ε-differentially private algorithm that achieves (δ, γ)-utility with respect to a
decayed sum F . Then, there exists an ε-differentially private algorithm A′ that uses A as a black box and
for each j and each u satisfies Pr[|yu(j)− F (x(u, j))| > δ] < γ.
7 Conclusion
We were inspired by the recent work on differential privacy of data analysis with continual updates [DPNR10,
CSS10a], a research direction motivated by monitoring applications. However, our observation is that in mon-
itoring applications typically recent data is more important than distant data. Hence, we need analyses that
are accurate on the most recent window of data or data where past is decayed (polynomially or exponentially,
as is common in database streaming).
We presented upper and lower bounds for a general class of functions — predicate sums — on window
and decayed data. We derived our upper bounds by balancing noise at different levels of a tree atop the data
in a nontrivial way, and derived lower bounds by inspiration from work on privacy of optimization problems.
There are many analyses of great interest on decayed data with differential privacy that remain open.
References
[AS64] M. Abramowitz and I.A. Stegun. Handbook of mathematical functions with formulas, graphs, and
mathematical tables, volume 55. Dover publications, 1964.
[CS03] E. Cohen and M. Strauss. Maintaining time-decaying stream aggregates. In PODS, 2003.
[CSS10a] T.H.H. Chan, E. Shi, and D. Song. Private and continual release of statistics. In ICALP, 2010.
[CSS10b] T.H.H. Chan, E. Shi, and D. Song. Private and continual release of statistics. Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2010/076, 2010.
[DGIM02] M. Datar, A. Gionis, P. Indyk, and R. Motwani. Maintaining stream statistics over sliding
windows:(extended abstract). In SODA, 2002.
[DMNS06] C. Dwork, F. Mcsherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith. Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data
analysis. In TCC, 2006.
14
[DPNR10] C. Dwork, T. Pitassi, M. Naor, and G Rothblum. Differential privacy under continual observation.
In STOC, 2010.
[Dwo10] C. Dwork. Differential privacy in new settings. In SODA, 2010.
[War65] S. Warner. Randomized response: A survey technique for eliminating evasive answer bias. Journal
of American Statistical Association, 1965.
15
